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Why Civil Protection Orders
Are Effective Remedies for Domestic Violence
but Mutual Protective Orders Are Nott
ELIZABETH TOPLIFFE*
INTRODUCTION
The problem of domestic violence' has been well documented over the
last fifteen years. 2 Yet battered wives continue to suffer from the myths
that surround wife battering. These myths include the belief that husbands
are justified in hitting their wives,' that wives could leave if they wanted
to,4 that battering occurs only in low-income households,' and that the wife
"deserves" the battering because she is somehow a "bad" wife.6 Institutions
have historically failed to meet the needs of battered women, and the
criminal justice system is no exception? Ministers, doctors, and police
t @ Copyright 1992 by Elizabeth Topliffe.
* J.D. Candidate, 1992, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington. B.A., 1988,
Indiana University. I would like to thank Lauren Robel for her help with this Note and for
her leadership and sponsorship of the Protective Order Project.
1. "Domestic violence" refers to violence between adults in an intimate relationship.
"Family violence" refers to other violence within the family such as child abuse or abuse of
the elderly. Martin, The Historical Roots of Domestic Violence, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON
TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DIMNSIONS OF FAILY VIOLENCE 3 (D. Sonkin ed. 1987)
[hereinafter DoMsTIc VIOLENCE ON TRIAL].
Throughout this Note I will use the terms "wife abuse" and "battered wives" as they are
used in D. MARTN, BATTERED WIVEs (1976). These terms refer to violence against spouses,
co-habitating lovers, or girlfriends. Id. at ix. The term "husband" will be used to refer to the
male batterer. I realize that not all of those women who are battered are married to their
abusers, but I use these terms to emphasize that there is some sort of relationship between
battered women and their abusers. I also realize that not all victims of this violence are women,
but a large portion of victims are women battered by their husbands. Goolkasian, Judging
Domestic Violence, 10 HAzv. WOMEN'S L.J. 275, 275 n.2 (1987) ("[N]inety-five percent of all
assaults on spouses or ex-spouses during 1973-77 were committed by men.").
2. See, e.g., R. DOBASH & R. DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE AGAINST
PATRIARCHY (1979); FAMLY VIOLENCE (L. Ohlin & M. Tonry eds. 1989); D. MARTIN, supra
note 1; E. PIzzEY, SCREAM QuIETLY OR THE NEIGHOaRS WILL HEAR (1977); Sonkin, Introduction
to DoMsTIc VIOLENCE ON TmIAL, supra note 1, at xix.
3. D. MARnN, supra note 1, at 19.
4. See id. at 77-87. Martin states that the main reason wives remain in battering relation-
ships is the fear of retaliation by their batterer. Id. at 77.
5. Id. at 20.
6. E. STANKO, INTIMATE INTRUSIONS: WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE OF MALE VIOLENCE 53-57
(1985); D. MRTIN, supra note 1, at 6.
7. See, D. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 88-102.
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officers often tell battered wives that, rather than leave the marriage, they
should try to work harder to be better wives.8
Some groups, however, are attempting to respond to the problems of
wife battering. Since 1976, over 500 shelters for battered women have
opened. 9 Psychologists and therapists are now trained to respond to issues
of family violence.' 0 States have enacted legislation to respond to the
problem, and all but two states now have legislation providing for civil
protection orders," which can be very effective for protecting a victim from
her abuser.
In this Note, I will first explore the effectiveness of these civil protection
orders. I will then examine a particular type of order, mutual orders, which
are orders against both the batterer and the victim. Finally, I will discuss
why mutual protective orders harm women who are victims of domestic
8. See, id. at 2-3 (letter from a battered wife describing her encounters with doctors,
ministers, police, and social service agencies).
9. Id. at 16.
10. Sonkin, supra note 2, at xx-xxi.
11. P. FINN & S. COLSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIv. PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLATION,
CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 1 (1990).
Arkansas and Delaware currently have no legislation for protective orders.
State statutes that authorize protective orders include: ALA. CODE §§ 30-5-1 to -11 (1989);
ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.35.010-.060 (1991); Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3601 to -3602 (Supp.
1991); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 540-553, 527.6 (1991); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 14-4-101 to -105
(1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-1 to -11, 46b-15 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 921, 950 (1975 & Supp. 1991); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1001 to -1006
(1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-13-1 to -22 (1991);
HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 586-1 to -11 (1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-6301 to -6317 (Supp. 1991); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2311-1 to -3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-
5.1-1 to -7 (Burns 1986 & Supp. 1991); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 236.1-.18 (West 1985 & Supp.
1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3101 to -3111 (Vernon 1990); Ky. REa. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.715-
.785 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 & Supp. 1990); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2131-:2142 (West
1982 & Supp. 1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 761-770 (1981 & Supp. 1987); MD. FAM.
LAW CODE ANN. §§ 4-501 to -510 (Supp. 1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, §§ 1-9
(West Supp. 1991); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950 (West 1986); MnIN. STAT. ANN. §
518B.01 (West Supp. 1991); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 93-21-1 to -29 (Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 455.010-.230 (Vernon Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-4-121 to -125 (1991);
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 42-901 to -927 (1988); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33.017-.100 (Michie 1991);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 173B:1:lla (Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-1 to :25-16
(West 1982 & Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-1 (1989); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812
(McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50B-1 to -8 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 14-07.1-01 to -08 (1991); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3113.31-.32 (Anderson 1989); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 60-60.7 (West Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 107.700-.730 (1990);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6101-6117 (Purdon 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 8-8-1 to -3, 15-15-3
to -6 (Supp. 1991); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-4-10 to -130 (Law. Co-op. 1991); S.D. CODIFID
LAWS ANN. §§ 25-20-1 to -13 (1984 & Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-3-601 to -614
(1991); TEX. FAN. CODE ANN. §§ 71.01-.19 (Vernon 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-6-1 to
-10, 77-3-1 to -12 (1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1101-1109 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§
16.1-253.1, 16.1-279.1 (1988); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 26.50.010-.090 (1986); W. VA. CODE
§§ 48-2A-1 to -10 (1986); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 813.12 (West Supp. 1991); Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-
21-101 to -107 (1988).
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violence, despite the fact that ordinary civil protection orders are effective.
I. CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS
AS A REMEDY FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A. How Civil Protection Orders Work
A victim of wife battering has limited options available for ending a
battering relationship. First, a battered wife may simply choose to leave her
batterer and seek no remedy within the legal system. With the increased
availability of battered women's shelters and networks among battered
women,' 2 this option is sometimes effective. A battered wife may also seek
criminal charges for assault and battery. When prosecuted effectively, this
remedy will leave a batterer behind bars where he no longer poses any
threat to his wife. Finally, a battered wife may seek civil remedies. These
include divorce proceedings and civil protection orders. In this section, I
will briefly discuss why a battered wife may want a civil protection order.
I will then discuss who and what type of behavior qualifies for a civil
protection order. Finally, I will discuss what types of remedies may be
included in a civil protection order.
A battered wife may seek a civil protection order because the other two
options are not satisfactory. Leaving a batterer and seeking no remedy
within the judicial system can be dangerous to the battered wife.'3 Criminal
proceedings are also not entirely effective because battered wives may shy
away from pursuing criminal charges. 4 Battered wives do this because they
may still be living with their batterers and might fear their retaliation. 5 A
batterer has unusual access to his victim and may lash out after being
charged or having been stigmatized by a conviction. 16 Unless protective
measures are involved in criminal charges, a battered wife is at risk of
further assault.' 7 Also, the criminal standard of "proof beyond a reasonable
12. Martin, supra note 1, at 16.
13. In fact, many of the most severe assaults on wives occur when they attempt to leave
the relationship. Evidence indicates that the abuse continues to escalate even after the wife
leaves the battering relationship. A. BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOUMN Kia 114 (1987).
The point of, or even the discussion of, separation is one of the most dangerous
times for partners in a violent relationship. Abusive men threatened with the loss
of their mates may be severely depressed, angry, agitated, homicidal, or sui-
cidal....
The threat of abandonment is so devastating to some men that they would
rather kill the woman than see her go.
Id. at 115-17 (footnotes omitted).
14. D. MAI~nN, supra note 1, at 11.
15. See P. FoNN & S. CotsoN, supra note 11, at 1.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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doubt" may be difficult to meet. Furthermore, the criminal justice system
itself may shuffle the woman from one prosecutor to another, forcing her
to share intimate details of her married life with several strangers." This
can cause the woman to drop the charges in frustration.
Divorce proceedings are also not always enough to protect a wife from
her batterer.19 Battering is often negotiated out of the divorce record. 2° This
is especially true in mediated divorces and divorces that are mutually agreed
upon2l because the battered wife's first concern is getting out of the
relationship, not protecting herself from future, postdivorce beatings.2
Furthermore, battered wives often experience increased and more severe
violence at the exact time they attempt to separate or divorce from their
husbands. 23
Civil protection orders address some of these issues. They can be used in
conjunction with or as an alternative to criminal charges. A temporary
protection order can often be issued to avoid harassment and intimidation
of the victim as a witness in an ex parte showing of evidence that the
woman is in danger of being harmed.24 This order will protect the woman
until the hearing when the permanent protection order is issued.25 Temporary
orders protect the woman while she seeks judicial remedies, allowing her to
feel more secure about pursuing them. 26
Eligibility requirements for civil protection orders vary from state to state.
Some states, such as Minnesota and Ohio, allow protection orders for
anyone who currently resides or who has resided in the past with her
abuser. 27 Other states are very restrictive and require the person seeking a
18. Soler, Domestic Violence Is a Crime: A Case Study-San Francisco Family Violence
Project, in Dom.sTsc VIOLENCE ON TRIAL, supra note 1, at 21, 29.
19. See Martin, supra note 1, at 10.
20. D. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 15.
21. See Ellis, Marital Conflict Mediation and Post-Separation Wife Abuse, 8 LAw &
INEQUALrrY 317, 327-29 (1990). See also Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Rede-
fining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 44 (1991) (Women will agree to a mutual
protection order to avoid a custody dispute.).
22. See Martin, supra note 1, at 10.
23. Mahoney, supra note 21, at 64-71.
24. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-2 (Burns Supp. 1991). The need for protection
until the hearing for the permanent order of protection is clear when one considers that many
battered wives experience "separation assault."
Separation assault is the attack on the woman's body and volition in which her
partner seeks to prevent her from leaving, retaliate for the separation, or force
her to return. It aims at overbearing her will as to where and with whom she
will live, and coercing her in order to enforce connection in a relationship. It is
an attempt to gain, retain, or regain power in a relationship, or to punish the
woman for ending the relationship.
Mahoney, supra note 21, at 65-66 (emphasis in the original).
25. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-2-3 (Burns Supp. 1991) (A temporary protective
order expires when a permanent protective order hearing is held.).
26. P. FINN & S. CoLsoN, supra note 11, at I.
27. Id. at 7, 10.
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protective order to have lived in a spousal relationship with the abuser at
some point. 28 Providing protection for women who are not living with their
abusers is very important, and states that have more restrictive legislation
should consider changing their statutes to meet the needs of these women.
Often, women who seek protection orders have fled the family residence in
order to escape abuse, which often increases or becomes more severe after
the woman has separated from her batterer. 29 Also, "about three-fourths
of law enforcement reports-as well as hospital emergency reports-of
domestic violence occur in cases in which the victim is not currently residing
with the abuser, either because the parties are divorced or separated, or
because the parties never lived together." 30
The behavior that qualifies as abuse also varies among the states. Some
require actual physical abuse, while others allow protection orders for
threatened abuse. 31 Even fewer states allow protection orders for attempted
physical abuse.3 2 Twenty-eight states specifically provide protection orders
for sexual assault. 33
Although procedures vary from state to state, women seeking protection
orders usually begin by obtaining an emergency order on an ex parte basis.
Emergency orders can be issued in all of the jurisdictions that have protec-
tion order legislation.3 4 The battered wife must usually show that she is in
"immediate and present danger" or has a justified fear of future domestic
abuse. Once the emergency ex parte order is issued, a hearing is set for a
permanent protection order. At the hearing, evidence and testimony are
presented before the permanent order is issued.
Women are not always represented by legal counsel at the hearing for a
permanent protective order. Finn and Colson report that "those victims
who are not represented by counsel are less likely to get protection orders-
and, if an order is issued, it is less likely to contain all appropriate provisions
regarding exclusion from the residence, temporary custody of children, child
support, and protective limitations on visitation rights."3 6 Having counsel
also aids the victim in presenting evidence and following the rules of the
court.37 Lawyers are especially important when the batterer appears at the
hearing with counsel because the victim's lawyer can offset the effects of
28. Id.
29. Ellis, supra note 21, at 317, 319.
30. P. Fn & S. COLSON, supra note 11, at 10 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
31. For a chart comparing statutory provisions identifying abuse that qualifies for a
protection order, see id. at 12-13.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 10-11.
34. Id. at 14.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 19.
37. Id.
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cross-examination of the victim and direct testimony from the abuser.
The permanent order can provide varied types of relief, and it is important
that it be written to provide all types of relief the victim may need. 8 The
order can specifically prevent the batterer from harassing his victim at work
as well as at her home and can also provide that the batterer stay away
from the family home even if it requires the batterer to be evicted.
Permanent orders also often contain no-contact, child custody, and visitation
provisions and mandatory counseling for the batterer3 9 Because the per-
manent protection order can include so many provisions, it can be quite
effective for dealing with all of the problems in a violent relationship.
However, despite these uses, the civil protection order has been criticized
as not being effective for battered women, 40 and I will address these concerns
in the next section.
B. Disadvantages of Civil Protection Orders
Although civil protection orders may seem relatively easy to obtain from
a legal standpoint, they are viewed by some as almost unobtainable for the
battered woman.41 First, simply paying filing fees may be an insurmountable
problem for the battered wife. 42 Even if she can afford such fees, she may
not be able to afford legal counsel. 43 This is equally true for lower-,
upper-, and middle-class wives because batterers often control all of the
money in the family. 44 Second, battered wives experience frustration over
the complexity of the legal steps involved in obtaining a legal order. 45
Finally, the lack of effective enforcement can render the order ineffective. 46
Filing fees are difficult for many women who may be financially strained
by a fee of only $50. Often courts waive fees only if the woman is already
receiving welfare or food stamps. 47 Even if there is no requirement that the
woman be receiving state aid, it can be difficult for her to meet the financial
requirements for a fee waiver if she is still living with or married to her
abuser. Some courts take into account the abuser's income in determining
38. Id. at 33.
39. Id. at 41-44.
40. D. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 105-09.
41. See R. DOBASH & R. DOBASH, supra note 2, at 219-22; D. MARTIN, supra note 1, at
105-07; E. PLzzEY, supra note 2, at 120-22; C. SCHWEBER & F. FEINMAN, CRItNAL JusTIcE
POLITICS AND WOMEN: THE AFTERMATH OF LEGALLY MANDATED CHANGE 14-19 (1985).
42. C. SCHWEBER & F. FEINMAN, supra note 41, at 18.
43. Id.
44. D. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 84-87.
45. Id. at 106.
46. Id. at 106-09.
47. Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts, Final Report,
reprinted in 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 827, 877 (1989) [hereinafter Minnesota Report]
(subsequent page references to 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.).
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whether the woman qualifies for a waiver of fees.4 Consequently, if the
income generated by the abuser puts the victim at an income level where
she does not qualify for a waiver of fees, she may find it impossible to
pay the fees because she obviously cannot go home and request the money
from her abuser. 4
9
The same concerns apply when a woman seeks legal counsel to assist her
in the filing process. Women often cannot qualify for Legal Aid when their
spouse's income is considered, and many women cannot afford qualified
legal counsel on their own.50 Although communities are responding to this
problem with pro bono lawyers who work for battered women's shelters or
law school projects where law students help women with the paper work,
there is still a great need for inexpensive but effective legal counsel for
these women."I Moreover, there are few lawyers who specialize in getting
protective orders for battered wives:
From a solicitor's point of view, battered wives are not good busi-
ness .... A complicated injunction can mean three appearances in court
during one week; getting a man committed to prison for breaking an
injunction can take four whole days. The fees are small compared with
what can be got for commercial work. 2
Because this problem exists, it is especially important that local bar asso-
ciations, law schools, and law firms need to take responsibility for becoming
trained in issues of domestic violence and assuming these cases as part of
their pro bono commitment. This is particularly true when the batterer
controls the family resources and can afford counsel for himself.53
Furthermore, the seeming complexity of the judicial system itself can be
a deterrent to women seeking protection orders.5 4 To get an order, a woman
must pay filing fees or complete extensive forms requesting a fee waiver.
She must also pay to have her batterer served. Then she must share her
personal stories with strangers, including her own counsel, prosecutors,
court clerks, and judges. Finally, she must appear at a hearing and testify
against her batterer. 5 If her batterer violates the order, she often has to go
through the same process in order to file civil contempt charges.16 Many
women give up in frustration with the whole system.5 7
There are also concerns about the efficacy of civil protection orders and
their enforcement. "Once the restraining order is granted, what can the
48. P. FInN & S. COLSON, supra note 11, at 19.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 22.
51. Id. at 24.
52. E. Pizzay, supra note 2, at 114.
53. See P. FiNN & S. CoLsoN, supra note 11, at 19.
54. D. MAnRT, supra note 1, at 105-09.
55. Id. at 3.
56. See D. MARziN, supra note 1, at 106.
57. See id.
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woman do with it? 'So she waves a piece of paper in his face and he
thumps on her anyway,' a Legal Services attorney said ... "58 Evidence
indicates that protection orders are less effective for extremely violent
batterers and are less likely to deter future abuse by those who are excessively
violent.5 9 However, when issued and enforced, civil protection orders appear
to be effective against batterers who are not extremely violent.6
Finally, when orders are issued, they are often not effectively enforced.6
Three types of responses appear to be the norm. First, police may not
respond until violence has occurred. 62 Second, when the order is violated,
courts often have discretion whether to hold the batterer in contempt. 63 In
at least one jurisdiction, courts frequently used deferred sentencing in
criminal contempt proceedings." Finally, there may be absolutely no formal
guidelines for dealing with violations of protection orders. 65
Despite the widespread belief that the effectiveness of civil protection
orders depends largely on their enforceability, few of the courts we
studied have developed guidelines or procedures for punishing violators.
As a result, there remains a great deal of confusion with regard to arrest
authority and appropriate sanctions for protection order violations."
When enforcement is not effective, the batterer feels that he can continue
to harass the victim without any risk to himself.67 Therefore, jurisdictions
with civil protection order statutes should monitor the enforcement of them.
Most states with statutory provisions for civil protection orders also have
some sort of statutory enforcement scheme. Other states rely on court policy
to enforce orders. Enforcement provisions usually contain civil contempt
remedies, criminal contempt remedies, and/or misdemeanor charges. 6 The
effectiveness of these remedies often depends upon the individual police
departments and courts, which often enforce the orders through unwritten
58. D. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 106.
59. Grau, Restraining Order Legislation for Battered Women: A Reassessment, 16 U.S.F.
L. REv. 702, 733 (1982).
60. P. FINN & S. CoisoN, supra note 11, at 2-3.
61. See D. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 107-09.
62. P. FINN & S. COLSON, supra note 11, at 49. Police will often not arrest even if the
offender is found in the victim's home because no violence has occurred. Id.
63. Id.
64. WASHINGTON STATE TASK FORCE ON GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS, GENDER &
JUSTICE IN THE COURTS 30 (1989) [hereinafter WASHINGTON REPORT].
65. See P. FINN & S. COLSON, supra note 11, at 49. "For enforcement to work, the courts
need to monitor compliance, victims must report violations, and, most of all, police, prose-
cutors, and judges should respond sternly to violations that are reported. These conditions
were not in place in most of the jurisdictions examined for this report." Id.
66. Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
67. Id. at 49. "Indeed there was considerable anecdotal evidence from the sites that some
batterers flout civil protection orders with impunity." Id.
68. Id.
1046 [Vol. 67:1039
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and informal policies. 69 All jurisdictions with protective order statutes must
ensure that the orders are enforced so batterers will follow orders entered
against them. When a court enforces orders inconsistently the batterer may
be less likely to follow the order because there is less risk of any legal
repercussions.
70
The disadvantages mentioned in this section are real. They need to be
taken seriously by the legal system. However, these problems are not
insurmountable, and effective legislation and enforcement go a long way
toward alleviating these problems. Once these problems are mitigated, civil
protection orders have distinct advantages.
C. Advantages of Civil Protection Orders
Despite the drawbacks discussed previously, Finn and Colson noted that
"[p]rotection orders, when properly drafted and enforced, were considered
effective in eliminating or reducing abuse by most of the judges, victim
advocates, and victims interviewed. ' 71 Protection order legislation often
includes temporary relief.72 Protection orders are also flexible and can
include forms of relief other than criminal or other civil proceedings. 71
Moreover, because of the lesser standard of proof and absence of criminal
procedural safeguards, civil protection orders are easier to obtain than
criminal convictions.74
One primary advantage of protection order legislation is that it often
includes procedures for obtaining temporary protection in emergency situa-
tions. 75 This allows the victim to protect herself until the permanent order
is issued. In contrast, when women only seek criminal sanctions, their
batterers are often released on bond, allowing the batterer to intimidate the
victim into not testifying or simply leaving the woman with a well-founded
fear that past abuse will continue if she presses charges. 76 By providing for
69. Id. at 49. Finn and Colson noted that courts should develop "a clear, formal policy
regarding violations in order to encourage respect for the court's order and to increase
compliance." Id. (emphasis in original).
70. Id. at 49-53, 59 (Effective enforcement is uncertain and depends on variables in statutes
and the behavior of police officers and judges.); Grau, supra note 60, at 719 (noting that a
protective order's effectiveness depends on statutorily mandated sanctions and police respon-
siveness to violations).
71. P. FINM & S. CotsoN, supra note 11, at 1 (footnote omitted).
72. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
75. P. FINN & S. CotsoN, supra note 11, at 2.
76. C. SCHWEBER & F. FEnrsMA, supra note 41, at 33. This accounts for the large number
of criminal domestic violence cases where the charges are dismissed, the victim refuses to
testify, or the victim otherwise refuses to cooperate. "In studies of courts operating under
regular assault statutes, investigators have typically found that approximately 80% of all cases
of domestic violence are dismissed by the court either at the victim's request or because the
victim failed to appear in court." Id. (footnote omitted).
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emergency ex parte orders, civil protection orders give women the security
they need to pursue the permanent order or criminal charges. Furthermore,
it often takes months for a criminal case to come to trial, whereas protection
orders can be issued without delay."
Civil remedies also allow domestic violence victims to choose what sort
of remedies they will pursue, giving them more control over their own
situation. Many women do not want the batterer jailed or criminally charged
because he may be the only source of support for the victim or her family. 78
Further, many battered wives fear more severe retaliation if they file criminal
charges.79
Protection order remedies also address issues that criminal proceedings
cannot. For example, the permanent order can restrict the abuser from
committing noncriminal acts such as harassment. 0 The order can also
provide for eviction when the abuser is still residing in the family home."'
Additionally, issues of child custody and visitation can be resolved in the
civil protection order.12 These issues might not otherwise be addressed in a
criminal proceeding.
Furthermore, the burden of proof is lower in a civil proceeding. 3 This
allows a battered wife to get some sort of relief even if the evidence itself
does not support a criminal conviction. This is very important in domestic
violence cases where the batterer and the victim are often the only witnesses
to the crime and there is often very little extrinsic evidence. Thus, a civil
protection order offers relief in those cases where the evidence does not
show criminal behavior beyond a reasonable doubt.
Civil protection orders are also used in conjunction with other civil and
criminal remedies. If there is a no-contact provision in a divorce decree,
the woman must petition for a hearing if that provision is violated.,,
However, if the same woman has a protection order in conjunction with
her divorce decree, immediate enforcement is available. s5 Also, if the woman
does decide to pursue criminal remedies, a civil protection order will often
77. P. FnN & S. COLsoN, supra note 11, at 3; see also WAsmNGTON PEPORT, supra note
64, at 30 (Service providers responding to a survey felt that one reason victims frequently
withdraw criminal complaints is that the system is too slow.).
78. P. FINN & S. COLSON, supra note 11, at 3.
79. C. SCHWEBER & F. FEiNuaN, supra note 41, at 33.
80. P. FINN & S. COLSON, supra note 11, at 3.
81. Id. at 33.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 3. Statutes for protection orders require some evidentiary showing before an
order may be issued. For example, Indiana requires a showing by a preponderance of the
evidence before a court may issue a protective order. IND. CODE ANN. 34-4-5.1-5 (Burns Supp.
1991). In contrast, Indiana requires that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in the
criminal context. IND. CODE ANN. 35-41-4-1 (Burns 1985).
84. P. FINN & S. CoLsoN, supra note 11, at 3.
85. Id. at 2.
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keep her safe until the trial. The order may prevent the batterer from
retaliating against the woman or intimidating her during the criminal pro-
ceedings .
8 6
Civil protection orders afford women flexibility in pursuing remedies
against their batterers. Such orders allow wives to choose what remedies to
pursue in a permanent order. Using protection orders in conjunction with
or in place of criminal proceedings also increases the flexibility of battered
wives' available remedies. Finally, a temporary order gives battered wives
much needed protection in emergency situations, allowing them to weigh
their options and consider what types of remedies they might pursue against
their batterers. This ability to choose empowers battered women while at
the same time protecting them from further abuse.
D. Argument for Civil Protection Orders
and Effective Enforcement of Civil Protection Orders
Because of the advantages of civil protection orders, they can be an
effective remedy for victims of domestic violence. A study of protection
orders in fifty states shows that such orders "can provide a workable option
for many victims seeking protection from further abuse."'8 7 However, leg-
islatures and courts must respond to the disadvantages of the civil protection
order to maximize its effectiveness.
The study by Finn and Colson found certain statutory weaknesses in
protection order legislation.8 As mentioned previously, many battered women
cannot pay filing fees. 9 Courts also are not open during the evenings and
weekends when most domestic violence occurs. ° The limitations on who
and what may qualify for domestic violence remedies do not take into
account the needs of all battered women.9' Finally, enforcement is not
always uniform or effective. 92 These problems could be easily remedied
through legislation. Filing fees could be eliminated for domestic violence
cases or waived based solely on the victim's income. It is also possible for
legislation to provide that emergency orders be issued on evenings and
weekends. Simply alerting the courthouse that a particular judge will be on
call for these situations would significantly help women during the most
dangerous times of the week. Limitations on who is eligible for a protection
order could also be eliminated by enacting broad legislation similar to
86. Id. at 3.
87. Id. at 1.
88. Id. at 18 (procedural weaknesses) and 49 (enforcement weaknesses).
89. See supra text accompanying note 42.
90. P. FINN & S. COLSON, supra note 11, at 49.
91. Id.
92. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
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Minnesota's statute, which provides remedies for "spouses, former spouses,
parents and children, persons related by blood, and persons who are
presently residing together or who have resided together in the past, and
persons who have a child in common regardless of whether they have been
married or have lived together at any time."' 93 Legislation could also include
remedies for threatened assault as well as actual assault in order to protect
women from escalating anger and violence. Finally, legislators could make
the violation of a protection order a criminal contempt, allowing police
officers to arrest respondents when they violate the protection order.
These legislative reforms would help make civil protection orders more
effective, but the most important area for reform is within the courts. Even
if legislation is enacted, judges must be familiar with the legislation and be
willing to use it in their courts. There is some evidence that legislation does
not always change judicialpractices. 94 "An evaluation of Washington state's
1979 Domestic Violence Act, examining compliance four years after its
enactment, found that many judges were unfamiliar with the Washington
Act and were not conforming with it. Some judges were not even aware of
the Washington Act's existence. '"9 Unless judges become aware of protective
order legislation and use the statutes effectively in their courts, the legislation
means nothing.
Furthermore, even when judges are aware of the legislation, judges'
attitudes toward victims of domestic violence can deter women from seeking
judicial remedies. Comments made in the courtroom indicate that some
judges suffer as much from gender bias as the rest of the legal system.9
Indeed, one study noted:
Based upon the perceptions and realities of injustice revealed in the
testimony, the committee concluded that:
1. Some judges and court personnel approach domestic violence cases,
whether consciously or unconsciously, with assumptions based not upon
personal experience or the facts of a particular case but upon stereotypes
and biases such as those listed above; and
2. Some judges and court personnel lack information about the psycho-
logical, economic, and social realities of domestic violence victims.
The committee found that gender bias contributes to the judicial
system's failure to afford the protection of law to victims of domestic
violence.97
93. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(2)(b) (West 1990).
94. Goolkasian, supra note 1, at 277.
95. Id. (citations omitted).
96. REPORT OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY COMMISSION 121-24 (1990)
[hereinafter FLORIDA REPORT]; Minnesota Report, supra note 47, at 875-77.
97. THE JUDICIA. CouNCrL ADVISORY ComMITrEE ON GENDER BIAS IN Tnm COURTS ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AcHIEvIN EQUAL JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 5 (1988)
[hereinafter CALnomNIA REPORT].
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In Minnesota, which has one of the most progressive domestic violence
statutes, women who seek remedies in the courts sometimes face further
victimization. The Report of the Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for
Gender Fairness in the Courts (Minnesota Report) stated:
[A] middle-aged, middle-class homemaker with a twenty-five year history
of abuse wrote to the Task Force of her attempt to use the court system
for the first time after her husband threw a golf ball at her twelve-year
old son. Her petition for an OFP [order for protection] was denied.
She said the judge told her that she was "the type who requested an
order one day and asked to have it rescinded the next." The judge
suggested that she provoke a more serious incident in order to make
sure that her case was strong enough to support the OFP. She said, "I
guess I need a knife in my back or at least to be bleeding profusely
from the head and shoulders to get an OFP." The judge told her,
"That's just about it."'"
This type of behavior is not limited to the Minnesota courts. For example,
the Report of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission
stated: "Upon learning that a husband had poured lighter fluid on his wife
and set her afire, one Palm Beach County judge in open court sang, '[y]ou
light up my wife' to the tune of the song, 'You Light Up My Life." ' 99 At
a minimum, this type of behavior indicates that some courts do not take
the situations of victims seriously.
Not all examples of judicial behavior are negative, however. Goolkasian
found that "[j]udicial behavior can have profound effects on the outcome
of domestic violence cases. If a judge shows an abuser that the law takes
domestic violence seriously, repeated violence is less likely.'2 °° Judicial
behavior that is supportive of battered women has a positive effect on how
the woman views the judicial system and her own power to end the
violence. 101
Judges themselves emphasize that the court needs to make it clear that it
takes domestic violence seriously, and will not tolerate violation of its
orders. 0 2 This has a deterrent effect on the respondent and stresses that
domestic violence is not acceptable behavior. 3
98. Minnesota Report, supra note 47, at 874-75.
99. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 96, at 121 (footnote omitted).
100. Goolkasian, supra note 1, at 277 (footnote omitted) (citing B. SmrrH, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, NON-S AGER VIOLENCE: THE CRnmNAL COURT'S RESPO SE 96 (1983)).
101. Cf. P. Fwn & S. COLSON, supra note 11, at 53 (Admonishing defendant can send a
clear message to the victim that she does not have to tolerate abuse.).
102. Id. at 52-53.
103. Goolkasian, supra note 1, at 282.
When the existence of battering is established before the court, "lectures" from
the bench on the serious nature of intra-familial violence can be eye-opening to
many defendants. The Attorney General's Task Force on Family violence urges
judges not to underestimate their ability to influence a defendant's behavior,
noting that "[e]ven a stern admonition from the bench can help to deter the
defendant from future violence."
Id. at 282-83.
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Judges can deter future violence by supporting the victims, telling them
they should not accept any abuse, and suggesting counseling for the vic-
timsA 4 In addition, admonishing the defendant sends a message to the
victim as well as the offender. When the justice system believes victims and
helps encourage them to call the police when orders are violated, the victim
herself is empowered. In one study of a temporary restraining order project,
the judge took the women very seriously and respected them for their
courage to seek temporary restraining orders.105 Unlike findings in other
jurisdictions,'10 most women in this study found their contact with the
judicial system to be positive. 7
In addition to feeling comfortable with the judicial system, it is also
important that women feel comfortable with their lawyers and that the
lawyers understand the dynamics of domestic violence. During hearings,
women have to answer questions about some of the most severe beatings
and intimate details of their lives. They tell stories of being hit, slapped,
kicked, thrown, raped, and threatened with lethal weapons. 08 This is an
emotional event for most women. Indeed, some of the victims report that
they felt the process invaded their privacy. 109 Because the woman has to
reveal such private experiences, it is essential that she feel at ease with her
lawyer. In order for the battered client to feel comfortable, the lawyer must
be empathetic and understanding, not accusatory, when responding to the
woman's story.
The lawyer also plays an essential role in obtaining direct and cross-
examination testimony"0 and is especially important when the respondent
appears with counsel. Opposing counsel may become confrontational during
the cross-examination of the victim and will often blame her for the violence
or dismiss the stories of violence by not treating them seriously."' The
104. Id. at 283; see also P. FINN & S. CoLsON, supra note 11, at 53.
105. Chaudhuri & Daly, Do Restraining Orders Help? Battered Women's Experience with
Male Violence and Legaf Process 22-23 (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law
Journal).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
107. Chaudhuri & Daly, supra note 105, at 22.
108. In order to obtain a protection order, the petitioner must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that she has been or is in danger of being abused. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §
34-4-5.1-5(a) (Burns Supp. 1991). At the Protective Order Project at Indiana University School
of Law, this is most commonly achieved through the testimony of the victim, requiring the
battered wife to tell her stories of violence in open court after first sharing them with a
volunteer student and volunteer attorney. Describing battered wives stories in the general
manner I use above does not fully describe the lives of terror battered wives lead. For a good
collection of a few battered wives' stories, see A. BROWNE, WmEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL
(1987).
109. A. BROWNE, supra note 108, at 23.
110. Id. at 23-24; see also CALiFoRiuA REPORT, supra note 97, at 35-36 (Petitioners appearing
with counsel were treated more seriously by the judges.).
111. For example, during one hearing for the modification of visitation that was handled
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victim's attorney can compensate for this by making appropriate objections,
controlling the direction of testimony, and preparing the victim for ques-
tioning. Furthermore, the lawyer may be able to elicit evidence of abuse
during cross-examination of the respondent.
Civil protection orders can be effective remedies for domestic violence., 2
However, their effectiveness depends upon the legislature's response to
statutory weaknesses." 3 The courts and the bar must also become educated
about domestic violence and learn to respond in appropriate ways in order
to ensure that civil protection orders are effective." 4 Once this occurs, civil
protection orders will operate as they were intended. Some of the disadvan-
tages will persist, especially for victims of extremely violent batterers, but
when the legal system ensures effective protective orders, the advantages of
such orders outweigh the disadvantages and allow battered wives a variety
of options for action against their abusers.
II. MUTUAL PROTECTIVE ORDERS
Mutual protection orders" 5 are civil protection orders that are entered
against both parties." 6 Like other civil cases, protection orders can be
by the Protective Order Project at Indiana University School of Law, the ex-wife testified to
a particularly severe beating and shared a story where her husband forced her to preform
vaginal, anal, and oral intercourse. After this testimony, counsel for the defendant commented
that "we're not here to re-hash the events of a bad marriage."
112. P. Fnm & S. COLSON, supra note 11, at 1.
113. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 94-110 and accompanying text.
115. I have attempted, as much as possible, to cite to established legal authority for support
of all assertions made in this Part. However, very little information is available on mutual
protection orders. Domestic violence was not widely studied until the mid to late 1970s. D.
MARTiN, supra note 1, at 16; E. PizzEy, supra note 2, at 1-3. As a result, I was unable to
locate large amounts of information on civil protection orders, and I could locate even fewer
sources on mutual protection orders. My purpose in writing this Note is not to draw significant
conclusions regarding mutual protection orders but more to begin serious discussion and
perhaps inspire qualitative studies on the effects of mutual protection orders.
Because this type of information is not yet available, I occasionally rely on my personal
experiences with the Protective Order Project at Indiana University School of Law. The Project
is now in its third year and relies on volunteer students and volunteer attorneys to obtain
protection orders for women. The Project's sponsor, Dean Lauren Robel, has noticed an
increased use of mutual protective orders by lawyers and judges alike. Through our experience
with mutual protective orders, the volunteers for the Project have experienced first-hand some
of the negative consequences of mutual orders.
Although reliance on personal experiences may be less than satisfactory to some, feminist
legal scholars have pointed out the importance of stories and narrative in legal scholarship.
See, e.g., Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. Rav. 971 (1991). Robin West has
also pointed out that even when authors are so bold as to use narrative and personal experience
it is often bracketed or placed in a footnote. West, Love, Rage and Legal Theory, 1 YALE J.
LAW & FEmnsM 101 (1989). Therefore, I include stories, hoping that they make up for the
lack of qualitative statistics and evidence regarding mutual protective orders.
116. P. FrNN & S. COLSON, supra note 11, at 47; see also Minnesota Report, supra note 47,
at 878-79.
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negotiated or "settled. ' 7 Battered wives can agree to mutual protection
orders if they wish. For purposes of this Note, I will refer to these types
of orders as "voluntary mutual protection orders." Defendants, or batterers,
can also counterclaim just as they can in any other civil case."' When a
defendant counterclaims, the judge, upon a showing of evidence, may issue
a protection order against both parties if the evidence suggests that it is
warranted. For purposes of this Note, I will refer to these types of orders
as "involuntary mutual protection orders." Three states have noted in
gender bias studies that involuntary mutual protection orders are issued
without a request from the defendant." 9 Basically, a mutual protective order
restrains both parties and requires that each person stay away from the
other.12 Like ordinary civil protection orders, courts may include other
forms of relief in the order.''
In this Part, I will focus on mutual protective orders. I will first discuss
why attorneys and judges might use a mutual order. Then I will examine
the problems with mutual protective orders. These concerns include the due
process rights and psychological well-being of the victim, problems with
enforcement, and the effect of mutual orders in future judicial proceedings.
I conclude that mutual protection orders should not be issued absent a
showing of mutual abuse.1'2
A. Why Mutual Orders Seem Appealing
Mutual protection orders seem appealing to lawyers for two reasons.
First, if both parties are willing to agree to a mutual protection order, such
an order can save time by avoiding a show-cause hearing. This is especially
117. Nine of ten civil cases filed in federal court are settled. R. BAsTRass & J. HARBAUGH,
INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 341
(1990).
118. J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, A. MILLER & J. SEXTON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND
MATERLAYs (5th ed. 1989) offers a good general discussion of counterclaims.
119. Minnesota Report, supra note 47, at 66-71; WAsHNGToN REPORT, supra note 64, at
24 (Four percent of judges issued mutual protection orders "frequently" or "usually.");
CALIFORIA REPORT, supra note 97, at 25 (Twenty-six and one-half percent of judges issued
mutual orders routinely; 64.1% issued mutuals when it "appear[ed] to them, that a mutual
order would likely reduce the violence between the parties." Only 14.9% selected the legally
correct alternative.).
120. P. FINN & S. CoLSON, supra note 11, at 47.
121. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text; cf. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-5(a)(3)
(Burns Supp. 1991) (describing types of relief that may be included in a protective order).
122. Indeed, the Senate Judiciary Committee seems to have reached the same conclusion.
The Violence Against Women Act of 1991 would give full faith and credit to protection orders
issued in other states but expressly denies full faith and credit for mutual orders. S. REP. No.
197, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 20 (1991). Furthermore, the Act, if passed, would provide funding
to states that adopt statewide laws prohibiting the issuance of mutual orders absent a showing
of mutual abuse. Id. at 24.
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appealing for lawyers who are often already working with a full schedule
and are working on protection orders on a pro bono basis.
Second, the victims do not often oppose such orders. They will agree to
a mutual order for several reasons. They may want to expedite the process,
cooperate with the lawyer and the judge,' 23 and avoid violent reactions from
their abusers. 24 The lawyer who does not understand all of the dynamics
of domestic violence may not understand this and may simply ask the victim
what she wants to do. This question is often asked in open court, where
the victim may feel too intimidated to reply in the manner in which she
truly wishes. 2
Lawyers and judges often think that whether the protection order is
mutual makes little real difference.126 Even with a protection order against
only the respondent, the victim usually cannot initiate contact with the
batterer without risking having an unenforceable order.127 Women are told
to stay away regardless of whether there is an order issued against them.
Judges often feel the same way as lawyers about mutual protection
orders."2 They may see mutual orders as an easy way to keep their dockets
clear while still issuing an order to protect the woman. 29 Therefore, judges
often issue a mutual protection order without any request from the respon-
dent or his lawyer."10 Why judges do this is difficult to determine, but it
123. Minnesota Report, supra note 47, at 879.
124. Battered wives who experience battered woman syndrome often exhibit characteristics
of learned helplessness where they try to please their batterer to avoid his violent reaction.
Douglas, The Battered Woman Syndrome, in Domisrc VIOLENCE ON TRIAL, supra note 1, at
39, 41-42. This strategy for avoiding violence may be especially important as battered wives
proceed through the courts in obtaining protective orders because violence is common and
often accelerates at the specific time the battered wife attempts to separate from her husband.
Mahoney, supra note 21, at 65-78.
125. Cf. Minnesota Report, supra note 47, at 879 (When asked by judges if they would
agree to a mutual order, very few women objected because they feared antagonizing the
judge.); CALFORIA REPORT, supra note 97, at ii (A transcript from a public hearing indicates
that battered wives are intimidated both by the presence of her batterer and by the judge
during hearings.).
In Monroe County, Indiana, attorneys often do not request a mutual order until the hearing.
At that point, the request is often couched in terms of a desire to save the court time and
allow the judge to proceed with her or his very busy docket. In this context, the victim may
feel pressure to help the court; she may also feel that she must give an immediate answer.
126. Cf. CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 97, at 26 (Judges see no harm resulting from the
issuance of a mutual protective order.).
127. Although statutes often do not require battered wives to stay away from their batterers,
courts and police will generally not enforce orders if the wife initiates the contact. In fact,
judges in Monroe County, Indiana tell wives who petition for a protection order that they
may not initiate contact with the batterer. This is 'also the advice given to petitioners by the
Protective Order Project.
128. Cf. CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 97; FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 96; Minnesota
Report, supra note 47; WASHNGTON REPORT, supra note 64 (Judges suffer from gender bias
in general and also share stereotypical views of battered wives.).
129. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
130. Minnesota Report, supra note 47, at 878.
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may have to do with a feeling that domestic violence cases are not "im-
portant" or should not take up the court's time.
Because of these "external" concerns of judges and lawyers-saving time
and seeing no real difference between normal and mutual protective orders-
both may be tempted to resort to mutual protective orders frequently.
However, when they do this in cases where there truly is one victim and
one batterer, they ignore some of the real difficulties of mutual protection
orders.
B. Due Process Concerns
The first concern about mutual protection orders issued by a judge without
a request from either party is that judges sometimes issue them without
hearing any evidence or only hearing evidence concerning one party's violent
behavior.' 3' The Minnesota Report indicates that in some Minnesota counties
mutual orders are routinely issued. 32 One person reported to the task force
about "one county in which, out of eighteen OFPs [Orders for Protection]
issued over a period of several months, all but two contained mutual
restraining orders."' 3 The Washington State Task Force on Gender and
Justice in the Courts reported that "[e]ight percent of the service providers
and four percent of the judges indicated that mutual protection orders were
issued 'frequently' or 'usually,' even when respondents did not file peti-
tions."134 The Report of the Judicial Council Advisory Committee on Gender
Bias in the Courts on Domestic Violence states that mutual orders are
routinely issued: "Testimony revealed that the practice of issuing mutual
restraining orders in domestic violence proceedings absent application and
proof by both parties is widespread. As one practitioner explained, in many
counties, it is 'almost routinely the practice to mollify everybody by just
giving mutual restraining orders."'131
Issuing this type of order is arguably a violation of the woman's due
process rights. 3 6 Under a due process analysis, the first determination is
whether there is a liberty or property interest at stake. 37 As applied to
mutual protection orders, this problem is not an easy one. Most of the case
law surrounding procedural due process involves the property rights of
131. Id. at 878-79.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 879.
134. WASHWnGTON REPORT, supra note 64, at 24.
135. CALIFoRNIA REPORT, supra note 97, at 25 (footnote omitted).
136. "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
137. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 487 (1980) ("ITlhe threshold question ... is whether
the involuntary transfer of a Nebraska state prisoner to a mental hospital implicates a liberty
interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause.").
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public employees in retaining their jobs.' Case law regarding liberty inter-
ests does not necessarily apply to mutual protective orders because these
cases mainly involve the interests of prisoners 39 or the rights of students in
public schools.""' In contrast, the liberty interest at stake for a battered
woman is an interest in freedom of movement and travel and protection
from the acts of her abuser. Further, a battered wife could not argue that
having a mutual protective order issued against her violated her due process
rights through damage to her reputation because the Supreme Court has
held that there is no liberty interest in reputation.' 4'
The Supreme Court has indicated that once a state creates a right a
protected liberty interest exists.1
2
[There] exists a variety of interests which are difficult of definition but
are nevertheless comprehended within the meaning of either 'liberty' or
'property' as meant in the Due Process Clause. These interests attain
this constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been initially
recognized and protected by state law, and we have repeatedly ruled
that the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment apply
whenever the State seeks to remove or significantly alter that protected
status. 141
Thus, the modern trend in the Supreme Court, as set out by Justice
Rehnquist in Paul v. Davis, is to recognize liberty interests only where states
have recognized that interest.
Most states require that some evidence be given before a protective order
can be issued. 4' Statutes normally require a showing that the person to be
138. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (A private employee's
cause of action based on statutorily barred employment discrimination constituted a property
right subject to procedural due process guarantees.); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976)
(rejecting police officer's asserted property and liberty interest in his job); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975) (Students facing temporary suspension from public school have property and
liberty interests that qualify for due process protection.); Board of Regents of State Colleges
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (finding no property or liberty interest of nontenured teacher
requiring due process before termination of employment).
139. See, e.g., Vitek, 445 U.S. at 480 (Procedural guarantees of due process clause are
triggered in the transfer of a prisoner to a state mental hospital for treatment.); Greenholtz
v. Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (Denial of parole does not involve a liberty interest that is
subject to procedural due process.); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (A prisoner's
liberty interest is not implicated upon transfer from a medium-security prison to a maximum-
security prison.).
140. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (Use of corporal punishment in a
public school does not require notice and an opportunity to be heard before the punishment.);
Goss, 419 U.S. 565 (Liberty and property interests are implicated by suspension from public
schools for more than trivial periods of time.).
141. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
142. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 488-91.
143. Paul, 424 U.S. at 710-11.
144. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-5(a) (Burns 1991) ("At the hearing, if the
allegation of abuse is proved by a preponderance of the evidence, the court ... [s]hall order
the respondent to refrain from abusing, harassing, or disturbing the peace of the petitioner
.... ") (emphasis added).
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protected is in some danger from the person restrained. 145 Because the states
protect individuals from restraint absent an evidentiary showing, they have
created a liberty interest in not being restrained unless there is a formal
hearing that shows potential danger. 46
In fact, the California Judicial Council Advisory Committee on Gender
Bias in the Courts on Domestic Violence (California Advisory Committee)
also reports that "[a]s a legal matter, the court lacks authority to issue a
restraining order absent a showing of 'a past act or acts of abuse." ' 47
Therefore, the states themselves have granted a benefit: no orders of
protection shall issue without a showing of abuse. This benefit, given to all
citizens of the state, cannot be removed without due process.
Since the state has granted a benefit that cannot be taken without due
process of law, the next issue is determining what level of process is due.
Under the balancing test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge,"' the costs of
requiring a set of procedures are weighed against the benefits from the use
of the procedures. Specifically, the courts consider the strength of the
private interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest weighed
against the government interest, including any administrative burdens. 49
In the case of mutual protective orders, the Mathews balancing test favors
women seeking protection. All citizens enjoy a right to be free from arbitrary
restraint. 50 This right extends to battered women and is implicated when
they are restrained by a protective order. The issuance of a protective order
against the batterer can sometimes be the first step in a long process toward
regaining independence and self-confidence. 15' Victims often find the issu-
ance of mutual protection orders humiliating and may believe that they are
being blamed for the violence.5 2 Furthermore, if mutual protective orders
are issued without any showing of violence, the probability is high that
such orders will be issued erroneously, hurting women who are not actual
abusers but are in fact victims.
On the other side of the balance, the cost to the government in maintaining
procedural safeguards is absent. Since mutual protective orders are only
145. California law requires a showing of past acts of abuse, and a court lacks authority
to issue a protection order absent such a showing. CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 97, at 25.
146. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
147. CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 97, at 25 (quoting CAL. Crw. PROC. CODE § 545). This
is the standard under the California Code and will vary among states.
148. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
149. Id. at 334-35.
150. This is reflected in the constitutional protections given to criminals.
151. Cf. Douglas, supra note 123, at 52 (Breaking away form a battering relationship is
often a step-by-step process.). Although all cases are different, many of the clients of the
Protective Order Project are either in the process of obtaining a divorce or have recently
divorced. Often these divorce decrees do not address the battering by the husband. These
divorce decrees also often do not address visitation and custody issues. These gaps in the
decrees cause women to return to the court for resolution of those issues.
152. CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 97, at 26.
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issued by judges, the courts are already involved in the process. Hearings
are already taking place. It therefore costs the government nothing to refrain
from issuing mutual protective orders unless there is a demonstration of
abuse by both parties. Since the court is already hearing evidence, no extra
time is taken if the court issues a protective order with no mutual terms.
When a mutual protective order is required, a court must take the time to
hear evidence regarding the abuse by the wife. However, the cost of hearing
an extra ten to fifteen minutes of testimony is negligible. Because the cost
to the government is nothing, the balance weighs in favor of not issuing
mutual protective orders unless there is a demonstration of violence by the
wife.
Case law also indicates that issuing mutual orders without any showing
of mutual abuse is a denial of due process. In FitzGerald v. FitzGerald,53
the Court of Appeals of Minnesota held that the trial court had no authority
to issue a mutual restraining order.1 4 The trial court had already acknowl-
edged that it had no authority to issue the order, and the court simply took
cognizance of that.'55 Therefore, in Minnesota, an appellate court has
recognized that in order to have authority to issue a mutual protection
order, there must be an evidentiary showing of abuse by both parties.Y
6
Despite this case the practice of issuing mutual orders without evidence is
still prevalent in Minnesota. 57
Marco v. Superior Court is the only published case where a mutual
protection order was held to violate the victim's due process rights.' In
Marco, the trial court entered a restraining order preventing either party
"from annoying or molesting each other or from committing any violence
on the other, or making any threats of violence."'5 9 This order was entered
on the pleadings without having a hearing on the matter, cross-examining
witnesses, or presenting evidence to the court.' 6° This is different from
FitzGerald in that here at least the respondent had requested a restraining
order against the woman. Even this petition was not enough evidence to
issue a mutual order, however.' 6' The trial court seemed to interpret Rule
11 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure to mean that if the pleadings
were signed by the lawyer they were true. 62 The appellate court held that
the pleadings with the lawyer's signature were not an adjudication of the
153. 406 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. App. 1987).
154. Id. at 54.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 52.
157. Minnesota Report, supra note 47, at 878.
158. 17 Ariz. App. 210, 496 P.2d 636 (1972).
159. Id. at 211, 496 P.2d at 637.
160. Id. at 212, 496 P.2d at 638.
161. Id., 496 P.2d at 638.
162. Id., 496 P.2d at 638.
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matter and that this was a violation of the petitioner's due process rights. 63
The appellate court said that the petitioner had not had her day in court.
Therefore, the order had to be vacated.164
Although no other appellate decisions concerning this issue have been
published, issuing mutual orders without hearing evidence is arguably a
violation of due process, especially when the respondent does not request a
mutual order. In the future, women may choose to make due process
arguments in order to fight mutual protective orders. This tactic may help
educate some judges regarding their stereotypical blame of the victim for
her battering. However, many battered women will be discouraged from
continuing their legal battles. Most battered women are only taking the first
steps to independence when seeking protective orders. Therefore, judges
and lawyers must educate themselves regarding the procedural due process
issues implicated by mutual protection orders. Once lawyers and judges
become educated they can prevent these violations of procedural due process.
C. Accountability of the Abuser
Regardless of the concerns about due process, there are good reasons for
judges to issue mutual protection orders only in rare cases. Judicial behavior
strongly influences the possibility of future violence, 65 and issuing a mutual
protection order can send a message both to the batterer and to the victim
regarding violence. 66
The batterer often rationalizes his abuse and blames his victim or others
for his violent behavior. 67 Even acts of self-defense can be rationalized by
the batterer as a justification for abuse. One woman reported to Del Martin:
Being beaten is a terrible thing; it is most terrible of all if you are not
equipped to fight back. I recall an occasion when I tried to defend
myself and actually tore my husband's shirt. Later, he showed it to a
relative as proof that I had done something terribly wrong. The fact
that at that moment I had several raised spots on my head hidden by
my hair, a swollen lip that was bleeding, and a severely damaged cheek
with a blood clot that caused a permanent dimple didn't matter to him.
What mattered was that I tore his shirt! That I tore it in self-defense
didn't mean anything to him.' 6
The issuance of a mutual order can reinforce the batterer's belief that the
problem is not his but is the result of external factors. He could easily
163. Id., 496 P.2d at 638.
164. Id., 496 P.2d at 638.
165. See supra notes 71-87 and accompanying text.
166. See CArFoRNiA REPORT, supra note 97, 'at 26 (Mutual protection orders tell victims
they are being blamed.).
167. Ganley, Perpetrators of Domestic Violence: An Overview of Counseling the Court-
Mandated Client, in DoMEsTIc VIOLENCE ON TRuIL, supra note 1, at 156-57.
168. D. MARTN, supra note 1, at 4.
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understand a mutual protection order to mean that the court blames the
victim as much as the batterer. The implication is that there is no account-
ability by the batterer.
Furthermore, the victim herself can recognize this implicit message. Women
who have experienced severe abuse over a long period of time may experience
battered women's syndrome.1 69 When women experience this syndrome they
suffer from a learned helplessness and try to control the behavior of their
batterer by attempting to please him.17 0 This behavior is reinforced by
societal myths that the woman either instigates or deserves the abuse.'
7 1
The feeling of helplessness due to the fact that it was my fault that I
got battered, which I think is common that a woman is blamed because
she provoked him. Certainly my husband immediately blamed me. "If
you had done so and so; if you hadn't done so and so." And the fact
that he did almost kill me and threatened if I said anything to the police
he would kill me and the destruction of confidence or any way out.7 2
Wives blame themselves for the battering, and their own concept of self-
esteem is lost. 173 When these myths are bolstered by the judicial system's
response, the woman feels that there is no place where she will be under-
stood. 74 The woman often finds the court's approach degrading, and the
experience reinforces the woman's belief that she is to blame for her abuse. 7 5
In order for judicial remedies to be effective, they cannot be based on
societal myths and misunderstandings about domestic violence. The batterer
must be held accountable for his behavior, and the victim must understand
that she is not required to accept the violence against her. Furthermore, the
courts must take care to protect the due process rights of the victim.
D. Other Problems with Mutual Protection Orders
There are problems with mutual protective orders other than due process
concerns or offender accountability. In general, mutual protective orders
are not enforced as well as regular orders. 76 Also, the mutual protection
order often prejudices the victim in future proceedings. 77
One of the worst problems with mutual protection orders is that when
the order is violated, the police are not sure how to proceed. 7 They do
169. Douglas, The Battered Woman Syndrome, in DomsTic VIOLENCE ON TRIAL, supra note
1, at 39-45.
170. Id. at 43-44.
171. R. DOBASH & R. DOBASH, supra note 2, at 11.
172. E. STANKO, INTImATE INTRUsIONs: WOMEN's EXPERIENCE OF MALE VIOLENCE 56 (1985)
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
173. D. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 83-84.
174. See id. at 3-5.
175. CA:ioRNA REPORT, supra note 97, at 26.
176. See infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
177. See infra notes 184-206 and accompanying text.
178. P. FIrN & S. CoLsoN, supra note 11, at 47.
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not know which party has a history of battering and do not know whom
to arrest. 179 Often they arrest no one or both parties.8 0 The Minnesota
Report stated:
Witnesses told the Task Force that when a judge issues a mutual OFP
[Order for Protection] there is a significant disincentive to seek enforce-
ment. When police officers are called out to enforce the order and learn
that it is a mutual OFP they often arrest both parties, "just to be safe,"
even if there isn't any evidence of mutual abuse."'
The California Advisory Committee heard similar testimony of significant
enforcement problems with mutual protection orders.8 2 The Washington
Report found that the victim herself may be arrested when a mutual order
is violated.8 3 Effective enforcement is one of the biggest problems for
protection orders,8 4 and the difficulties with enforcement seem to increase
when the order is a mutual one.
The most devastating effect of mutual protection orders is their use in
future proceedings against the woman. 5 They can be used in divorce
proceedings, civil proceedings on domestic violence,8 6 and criminal pro-
ceedings against the abuser. 8 7 Breaking away from the violence is not always
accomplished in one step, however. 8 Also, husbands will often seek new
forms of control when the old (violence) fails. 8 9 As a result, custody and
visitation may become legal concerns only after the divorce. 9° Custody often
becomes a tool in post-separation negotiations.' 9' Moving in steps is a
natural part of the process of moving from being a victim to being a
survivor.'9 However, there are severe consequences within the legal system
for not completing these stages at once.
179. CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 97, at 25.
180. P. FiNN & S. COLSON, supra note 11, at 47.
181. WASHINGTON REPORT, supra note 64, at 879.
182. CALrFoRuuA REPORT, supra note 97, at 25.
183. WASHINGTON REPORT, supra note 64, at 24.
184. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
185. See WASHINGTON REPORT, supra note 64, at 24.
186. Both divorce and civil domestic violence proceedings are open to issue preclusion. Once
a court has issued a final judgment on an issue, that judgment may be used against the parties
in future proceedings under the doctrine of res judicata. See, J. CoUmD, J. FRIEDENTHAL, A.
MILLER & J. SEXTON, supra note 118, at 1166-86. This is equally true for mutual protection
orders. Once a mutual order is issued, it can be assumed that the wife was abusive because
no order may be issued without a showing of abuse. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-
5(a) (Bums Supp. 1991).
187. Mutual protection orders have also been used as a defense in criminal contempt
proceedings as evidence that the woman is equally at fault. WASHINGTON REPORT, supra note
64, at 24.
188. Douglas, supra note 169, at 52.
189. Mahoney, supra note 21, at 44.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See id.
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First, getting a protection order, getting a divorce, and modifying a
divorce decree are all often connected in reality but are treated as separate
issues in the courts. Once a divorce decree is issued, the court assumes that
all events and issues that occurred before the decree was issued are now
settled.' 93 If a woman wants to modify the decree, she cannot introduce
evidence of events occurring before the decree.' 94 This works against battered
women because often the issue of battering will not come up in the hearing
for divorce. This is especially true in mediated divorces, 95 where the woman
wishes only to get'out of the marriage in the easiest way possible. Therefore,
she does not fight over many issues. Divorce decrees in battering cases will
often be simple documents awarding broad visitation for children, joint
custody, or uneven property settlements.'19 Later, as the woman becomes
more empowered, she may seek more stringent custody and visitation
limitations. She may even become aware of abuse against the children.
However, when she goes back to court to modify visitation or custody, she
can only address events that have occurred since the divorce decree was
issued.'9 All evidence of the battering behavior of the respondent prior to
the divorce never makes it into the court records. The fact that none of
these issues came up at the time of the divorce does not matter; the woman
is bound to that decree. '
The problem is even more complex when mutual protection orders are
issued. When the mutual order is "voluntary," meaning at least one of the
parties requested a mutual order, there is often no hearing of evidence
regarding the violent behavior of the respondent. 199 When the woman seeks
to remove custody or visitation from the batterer, she cannot submit any
evidence regarding his violent behavior because all those issues are considered
to have been concluded at the original hearing. 200 Therefore, the court has
no evidence before it to indicate that the respondent is an abusive and
193. This results from the doctrine of issue preclusion. For a discussion of issue preclusion,
see, J. CouND, J. FPiEDE'rNAL, A..MMLnR & J. SEXTON, supra note 118, at 1166-86.
The Protective Order Project at Indiana University handled one case where evidence of past
beatings, rapes, and murder threats were not permitted in visitation or contempt proceedings
because the incidents took place before the mutual protective order was issued. Because the
client had agreed to the mutual protective order, the court was making these decisions (visitation
and contempt) with no evidence or understanding of the severity of the abuse that had occurred
within the relationship.
194. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
195. Ellis, supra note 21, at 330.
196. Walker & Edwall, Domestic Violence and Determination of Visitation and Custody in
Divorce, in Dom.s'mc VIoLENcE oN TIRUA, supra note 1, at 127.
197. See supra note 186.
198. Id.
199. CALioRNiA REPORT, supra note 97, at 25; Minnesota Report, supra note 47, at 878-
79; WAsHiNGToN REPORT, supra note 64, at 24.
200. See supra note 186.
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violent person. Even when courts are aware of the violence, judges still
may award custody to the batterer.20 1 Therefore, it is important that the
battered wife get evidence of the battering into the record.
Even where the mutual order is "involuntary," it can still be used against
the woman in future civil proceedings. If the woman petitions for a
modification of custody or visitation based on the abusive behavior of the
respondent, the batterer can often use the mutual protection order as an
indication that she was also violent, making changes in custody and visitation
very difficult to obtain.202 Courts will sometimes even award custody to the
batterer. 20
Furthermore, the mutual order can be used in future criminal proceed-
ings.204 Sometimes the woman will seek a protection order in addition to
filing criminal charges. 2°s Due to the delay in the criminal justice system,
the protection order will usually be in effect before the criminal charges go
to trial.206 Another time criminal charges are brought is when the order is
violated by the respondent. 211
In order to ensure that women are adequately protected from their
abusers, courts should issue mutual protection orders only when there is
evidence of mutual abuse. Otherwise, victims are afforded no real protection
at all by the order because it is not enforced. Furthermore, courts and
lawyers should consider the effect a mutual order might have in future
proceedings involving the victim of the abuse. Protecting her and, in some
cases, her children from future abuse should be the main concern. Regular
civil protection orders address this concern without causing the later adverse
consequences found with mutual orders. Therefore, mutual protection orders
should be reserved for cases where both parties are violent and abusive
toward each other.
CONCLUSION
There are compelling reasons to use civil protection orders as a remedy
for domestic violence. They allow creative remedies to be used to address
all problems in each individual case of domestic violence. They also give
the victim control over what types of remedies to seek and when to seek
201. Mahoney, supra note 21, at 45.
202. "Mutual protection orders can and are used against victims/petitioners. For example,
in criminal proceedings where respondents are charged with the originating offenses, defense
attorneys may introduce the mutual protection orders as evidence that civil courts have found
the victims to be equally at fault." WASHINGTON REPORT, supra note 64, at 24.
203. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1041, 1090-93 (1991).
204. See WASHINGTON REPORT, supra note 64, at 24.
205. P. FINN & S. COLSON, supra note 11, at 1.
206. Id. at 3.
207. Id. at 57.
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them. However, when civil protection orders are issued as mutual protection
orders, these benefits can be lost. The woman feels that she is to blame for
the violence or that the justice system is not holding the batterer accountable
for his behavior. The court verifies the batterer's belief that he is not to
blame for the violence because it is caused by external factors. A mutual
order is also less effective for enforcement purposes and can be used in
future proceedings against the victim to the advantage of the batterer. In
order to avoid these problems, states with protective order statutes should
require that a respondent petition for a mutual order and show some
evidence of mutual abuse before the order can be issued.

